South Florida Criminal Law Blog

In Ricketts v. State, Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal explains the Williams rule, which allows Sunshine State prosecutors to introduce evidence that may seem unrelated to the crime for which a defendant is charged in order to show that the person knew exactly what he was doing.

Jerome Ricketts was arrested and charged with the trafficking of between 25 and 2,000 lbs of marijuana after a stash of the drug was found in a crate in a storage unit he rented under an assumed name. At trial, he sought to prevent the prosecution from entering into evidence a number of comparable, empty crates featuring similar shipping labels with addresses from California, which were also found in the storage unit and police said smelled strongly marijuana (enough, at least, to get the attention of a drug-sniffing police dog). The trial court allowed the evidence, ruling that it was relevant to prove Ricketts' knowledge of the crime.

The Fourth District affirmed the decision on appeal, finding that the evidence was admissible under the so-called Williams rule. Evidence of other crimes is general not admissible for the purpose of proving a defendant's bad moral character of propensity for wrongdoing. In Williams v. Florida, however, the state supreme court ruled in 1959 that evidence of collateral crimes is admissible for the purpose of proving things like a defendant's motive, intent, knowledge or lack of mistake.

"In determining the admissibility of collateral crime evidence, the trial court must make two determinations: (1) whether the evidence is relevant or material to some aspect of the offense being tried, and (2) whether the probative value is substantially outweighed an any prejudice," the court explained, citing its 2011 decision in Santiago v. State.

Here, the court explained that Ricketts was charged with violating section 893.135 for "unlawfully and knowingly" purchasing or possessing a certain amount of marijuana. The evidence of the other crates -presumably also used for shipping and storing the drugs - was therefore relevant to proving the "knowingly" element of the crime, according to the court. "Because knowledge is a specific element of the crime charged," the court ruled that "the evidence of the other crates was admissible Williams rule evidence because it was relevant or material to some aspect of the offense being tried, rather than used simply to prove propensity."

Continue reading "Florida Court Explains Williams Rule in Marijuana Trafficking Case - Ricketts v. State" »

Florida criminal cases are often won or lost based on witness testimony. While not on trial, sometimes those witnesses aren't exactly choir boys. In State v. Jouzdani, Florida's First District Court of Appeal explains the rules for questioning a witness about his or her criminal history on the stand.

Arman Jouzdani was convicted on charges of kidnapping, extortion and grand theft stemming from a botched marijuana sale. According to the Court, two men - Cameron Suarez and Tim Sommers - arranged to buy two pounds of the drug from a supplier on Jouzdani's behalf. According to testimony in the case, Jouzdani gave the men $1,800; Sommers took the money and went to make the buy, while Suarez remained at the auto shop where Jouzdani worked. Reportedly, Sommers later called Suarez at the shop, telling him that the supplier had robbed Sommers of the money.

Jouzdani reportedly became angry when he learned that his money had been stolen. According to testimony, he called his girlfriend and asked her to bring him his gun. The weapon allegedly arrived, along with Jouzdani's friend, Aaron Rollins. Suarez testified that both men pointed the gun at his head at various times, threatening to shoot him if he didn't come up with the $1,800.

Several hours later, Suarez reportedly offered to give Jouzdani a car in exchange for the lost money. He testified that he called his friend Jeremy Bisiaux and asked him to drive the car from Jacksonville to the auto shop where Jouzdani was being held in Gainesville. Police officers, who had reportedly been tipped off by Bisiaux, arrived on the scene as Jouzdani, Rollins, Suarez and Bisiaux were leaving the shop.

At trial, Jouzdani testified that he asked his girlfriend to bring the gun, but never actually possessed the weapon. Rather, it was Rollins holding the gun, according to Jouzdani. He also said that Suarez was not held against his will. Larry Pringley, a mechanic at the auto shop, also testified. Pringley, who was working on the night of the incident, said he did not see a gun at any point, nor did he see Jouzdani threaten or restrain Suarez at any time. According to Pringley, Suarez was mostly walking around, talking on his phone.

On cross-examination, the prosecution sought to impeach Pringley by asking him about six previous criminal convictions for receiving stolen property. Pringley admitted that he had been convicted on the six charges about 20 years ago and served jail time, but could not remember whether he had been actually adjudicated guilty (in certain situations, a judge may withhold adjudication, even where the defendant is sentenced to jail time).

Continue reading "Court Says Prosecution in Florida Kidnapping Case Could Not Ask Witness About Prior Convictions - State v. Jouzdani" »

Can Florida police officers use evidence from a cell phone taken from a person during an arrest against the person at trial? That is the question in State v. Glasco. For the time being, at least, the answer is "yes."

Richard Glasco was arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and other related drug chrages. When police handcuffed and searched him, they discovered a cell phone. Glasco was taken to the local police station, where the arresting officers looked through his cell phone as Glasco was being processed into jail. Among other evidence, they found text messages indicating that Glasco had cocaine and that he intended to sell it.

At trial, Glasco attempted to suppress the evidence taken from the cell phone, which also included photographs and a call history. Glasco's attorney argued that because the officers did not have a warrant to search the phone, the evidence was gained from an unlawful search. The trial agreed, granting the motion.

On appeal, however, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision. The Court noted that the trial court made its decision before the First District's ruling in Smallwood v. State, in which the court ruled that evidence taken from a cell phone incident to an arrest could be used in criminal prosecution. While there was no reason for the arresting officer in Smallwood to believe that the cell phone contained evidence relevant to the crime at issue, the court based its decision on a 1979 U.S. Supreme Court decision - U.S. v. Robinson - holding that containers found upon a person incident to arrest may be searched without "additional justification."

The Smallwood court, however, noted the potentially vast differences between a cell phone and a simple container, particularly the large amounts of sensitive personal information that may be contained in a cell phone. As a result, the court asked the Florida Supreme Court to resolve the question as to whether a police officer can search photographs in a cell phone incident to an arrest without reasonable belief that the phone contains evidence of a crime.

Continue reading "Court Sends Question of Cell Phone Search During Criminal Arrest to Supreme Court - State v. Glasco" »

In Dieujuste v. State, Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal explains that a person's presence at the scene of a crime is not enough to find the person guilty of criminal conspiracy.

Betsy Dieujuste was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in oxycodone with co-defendants Junior Julien and Lincoln Jackson. At trial, it was revealed that Delray Beach police officer Edward McCabe was working undercover when he bought 16 oxycodone pills from David Levine. McCabe later contacted Levine again, seeking to buy another 50 pills. He went to Levine's apartment and was introduced to Sarah Billett. McCabe gave $700 to Levine, who handed it to Billett.

Outside the apartment, Billett approached a black car, registered to Dieujuste and driven by Junior Julien. Lincoln Jackson was a passenger in the car. Julien got out of the car and handed pills to Billett in exchange for the money. Delray Beach police officers observing the transaction also noticed a third person in the back of the car, who was later identified as Dieujuste. Billett returned to the apartment and handed 46 oxycodone pills to McCabe.

The black car drove off and stopped one block away, where Julien exited and drove off in another vehicle. Dieujuste got behind the wheel of the black car and was stopped and arrested shortly thereafter. The arresting officers found $400 in Dieujuste's purse, matching the money originally given to McCabe. They also found a prescription pill bottle with Dieujuste's name on it and containing 54 oxycodone pills. Later tests were unclear as to whether the pills came from the same batch as those given to McCabe.

Dieujuste testified that the $400 was rent money owed to her by her live-in boyfriend. The boyfriend had told Dieujuste to get the money from Julien, who owed money to the boyfriend. She further testified Julien asked her to drive him to get money that was owed to Julien. She said she did not know what Julien did when he left the car or how he got the money, $400 of which he then gave to Dieujuste.

Continue reading "Florida Court Reverses Conspiracy Conviction in Oxycodone Trafficking Case - Dieujuste v. State" »

In Bribiesca-Tafolla v. State, the Fourth District Court of Appeal explains that prosecutors in a Florida DUI case must prove "the body of the case" before entering any evidence regarding the defendant's admission that he or she committed the crime.

Appellant Jose Bribiesca-Tafolla was convicted on two counts of driving under the influence causing serious bodily injury. The accident that led to his arrest occurred shortly after seven in the morning on US 1 in Jupiter, Florida. Appellant was traveling southbound in a truck with a friend when the truck crossed into the northbound lane and struck an oncoming car. The truck flipped, ejecting Appellant and his friend, and then struck a third car.

A police officer who met with Appellant at the hospital where he was being treated for his injuries testified at the trial that Appellant admitted that he was driving the truck at the time of the accident. According to the court, the officer testified that Appellant "appeared to be impaired based on his bloodshot eyes [and] the odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath..." A blood test showed that his blood alcohol level was .13 - more than the legal limit of .08 - five hours after the accident.

On appeal, Appellant argued that the officer should not have been permitted to testify about Appellant's admission because the state had not yet established corpus delicti: that a DUI crime was committed. Specifically, Appellant argued that prosecutors could not establish that he was driving without the officer's testimony.

"Corpus delicti means literally `the body of the crime,'" the court explained. "Before a confession is admitted the state has the burden of proving by substantial evidence that a crime was committed," it noted, citing the Florida Supreme Court's 1976 decision in State v. Allen. Such proof may be in the form of either direct or circumstantial evidence.

Continue reading "Corpus Delicti in Florida DUI Cases - Bribiesca-Tafolla v. State" »

It is a basic premise of Florida criminal law that a defendant can only be tried on the crimes for which he or she is charged. But what about using a defendant's previous crimes or other "bad acts" in order to prove that he or she also committed the crime now charged? As Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal explains in Harden v. State, it depends.

Appellant Larry Harden was accused of beating and raping his then-girlfriend, K.W. after an argument in which Harden accused K.W. of having a relationship with another man. Prior to trial, the state prosecutor assigned to the case indicated that he intended to call K.W. as a witness and to ask her, among other things, about a previous domestic violence incident allegedly perpetrated by Harden six months prior to the incident at issue in the case. Despite Harden's objection, the trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible as probative of his motive and intent. Following trial, Harden was convicted of sexual battery, false imprisonment and domestic battery.

On appeal, the Fourth District found that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting K.W. to testify about the alleged prior domestic violence incident. The general rule that any evidence that is relevant to proving a fact at issue in a case is admissible comes with some important exceptions, the court explained. Under Section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2011), for example, evidence "is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

Citing Section 90.404(2)(a), the court further explained that fact evidence about a defendant having committed a similar crime as the one with which he or she is currently charged is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue: proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, etc. The evidence is not admissible, however, where it is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." This, according to the court, holds true even if the "prior bad act" is based on different factual circumstances than the acts at question in the present case.

In this case, "the earlier incident of domestic violence did nothing more than demonstrate appellant's propensity for violence against his girlfriend," the court ruled. According to the court, the primary issue at trial was whether K.W. consented to having sex with Harden on the night that she claims he raped her. Thus, Harden's motive and intent were not in question. To the extent that the evidence was relevant in explaining why K.W. was slow to report the incident to the police, the court found that its value was outweighed by the potential unfair prejudice it could create: leading the jury to believe that because Harden allegedly committed domestic violence against K.W. in the past, he was likely to have committed the rape.

Continue reading "Florida Court Prohibits Evidence of Previous Domestic Violence in Rape Case Against Boyfriend - Harden v. State" »

In a recent post, this blog discussed how the "double jeopardy" rule prevents a person from being charged with the same offense twice for the same act. In Nshaka v. State, the Fourth District Court of Appeals explains another important protection for a person charged with a crime in Florida, which limits the prosecution's ability to introduce evidence of other crimes or "bad acts."

Appellant Pharaoh Nshaka was convicted on charges of burglary and robbery and sentenced to 30 years in prison after being deemed a habitual offender. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's decision to allow the jury to hear evidence pertaining to other burglaries committed by Nshaka.

Nshaka allegedly robbed and assaulted the victim outside of a preschool in Hollywood. He then broke into her car and stole the victim's purse and a DVD player. He was arrested after the victim notified police that she saw her assailant driving in the neighborhood where the crime occurred and provided the license plate number of the car he was driving. The victim later identified Nshaka as the assailant in a photograph line-up.

In Florida, evidence of a criminal defendant's previous "crimes, wrong or acts" is admissible in a criminal trial where the evidence is relevant to prove a material fact in the case, such as motive, knowledge or intent. It is not admissable, however, solely for the purpose of proving the defendant's bad character or propensity for wrongdoing. Citing the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Robertson v. State, however, the court noted that "admission of evidence of other crimes is presumptively harmful because the evidence from the other cases, which is irrelevant to the current case, could be used by a jury to charge a defendant." Thus, a court considering whether to allow evidence of prior bad acts must determine: 1) whether the evidence is relevant to a material fact in the case; and 2) whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

In this case, the prosecution presented evidence that Nshaka had committed two other burglaries within a five-week span of the crime at issue. The court held that evidence of these crimes should not have been presented to the jury because "the current robbery charge did not occur close in time with the collateral crimes and the crime occurred in a very different manner than the two previous burglaries." According to the court, other crimes "must have some special character or be so unusual as to point to the defendant," in order for evidence regarding them to be admissable.

Continue reading "Court in Burglary Case Disapproves Evidence of Defendant's Previous Crimes - Nshaka v. State" »

Evidence rules often play a crucial role in Florida criminal cases because they determine the information that a judge or jury will have before it in deciding on a case. In State v. Bowers, the state's Supreme Court weighed in on an important evidentiary dispute, limiting the state's ability to rely on one police officer's recollection of another's knowledge in fighting an effort to suppress certain evidence.

Michelle Bowers was arrested after a traffic stop and charged with marijuana and drug paraphernalia possession as well as DUI. At trial, she sought to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing that the stop was not based on probable cause.

The officer who initially pulled Bowers over didn't appear at a hearing on the motion to suppress. Instead the state called as a witness a second officer who was not present during the initial stop, but later appeared at the scene to assist in the DUI investigation and subsequent arrest. The second officer was asked to testify about the reasons why Bowers was originally pulled over. The county court overruled an objection by Bowers' attorney, who argued that this testimony amounted to inadmissable hearsay (testimony about something for which the witness has no direct personal knowledge, often based on another's statements). Nevertheless, the county court granted Bower's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop.

The matter eventually arrived before Florida's Second District Court of Appeals which ruled that the second officer's testimony was inadmissable. In so doing, the Second District found that the Fourth District Court of Appeals' decision in Ferrer v. State - in which it held that, under the "fellow officer rule," an officer who appeared at the scene following a traffic stop and tested a driver for alcohol and drugs could testify that the initial officer told him that he observed the driver driving with an expired tag - was wrongly decided.

The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the Second District, holding that the fellow officer rule does not allow the second officer to testify as to what the first officer told him about why he stopped Bowers' car. It explained that the rule "was developed to assist officers investigating in the field to make arrests and conduct searches..." The rule accomplishes this goal by providing that "the collective knowledge of officers investigating a crime is imputed to each officer and one officer may rely on the knowledge and information possessed by another officer to establish probable cause," which generally must exist in order for an officer to stop a car, search a home or make an arrest.

Continue reading "Florida Supreme Court Explains Hearsay and the Fellow Officer Rule - State v. Bowers" »

In U.S. v. Ricketts, a federal court in Florida explains how judges consider whether the prosecution in a federal criminal drug trial can introduce evidence about the defendant's prior convictions.

Defendant Rodrigo Ricketts was indicted on one count of attempted possession of cocaine for distribution, a federal violation under 21 U.S.C. § 847(a)(1). According to the government, Ricketts told a confidential informant that he wanted to buy "several kilograms" of cocaine from the informant and was arrested when he allegedly tried to trade his car for one kilogram.

At trial before the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which hears cases in Orlando, the prosecution attempted to introduce into evidence Ricketts' prior convictions: in 1993 for marijuana possession; and in 2001 for possession of drug paraphernalia. Through his attorney, Ricketts challenged the move, arguing that the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs any probative value in introducing the evidence.

It is a fundamental tenant of federal criminal trial law - codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) - that evidence related to a defendant's prior convictions is not admissible to prove the defendant's character in order to show action in conformity with that character. Such evidence may be admitted for another purpose, however, if its probative value outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice.

Ruling in Ricketts' favor, the court explained that it operates under a three-part test in considering the admissibility of prior conviction evidence:

First, the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character. Second, as part of the relevance analysis, the evidence must be sufficient to support a finding that the defendant actually committed the extrinsic act. Third, the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.

Continue reading "Florida Court Explains the Rules for Using Evidence of Previous Convictions in a Criminal Drug Trial - U.S. v. Ricketts" »